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 Abstract 
 
In the absence of market frictions, the cost of carry model of stock index futures pricing predicts that 
returns on the underlying stock index and the associated stock index futures contract will be 
perfectly contemporaneously correlated.  Evidence suggests, however, that this prediction is violated 
with clear evidence that the stock index futures market leads the stock market.  We argue that 
traditional tests, which assume that the underlying data generating process is constant, might be 
prone to overstate the lead-lag relationship.  Using a new test for lead-lag relationships based on 
cross correlations and cross bicorrelations we find that, contrary to results from using the traditional 
methodology, periods where the futures market leads the cash market are few and far between and 
when any lead-lag relationship is detected, it does not last long.  Overall, our results are consistent 
with the prediction of the standard cost of carry model and market efficiency. 
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 An Alternative Approach To Investigating Lead-lag Relationships 
  Between Stock And Stock Index Futures Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The lead-lag relationship between stock and stock index futures markets has been the subject of 
intense empirical investigation in recent years (see, for example, Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987), 
Herbst, McCormack and West (1987), Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992) and Tse (1995)).  In 
the absence of market frictions and transaction costs, the returns on a stock index and its 
corresponding underlying index futures contract will be perfectly positively contemporaneously 
correlated.  In reality, however, a number of researchers have found significant evidence that there is 
cross autocorrelation between the returns on stock index futures and the returns on the underlying 
index, that is, there is a lead-lag relationship between these markets.  
 
Whilst there seems to be a consensus on the finding that stock index futures markets lead underlying 
stock markets, there are problems with extant tests of lead-lag relationships and as such, these 
findings may be overstated.  First, traditional tests of lead-lag relationships are typically carried out 
in the spirit of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) linear causality tests.  The problem here is that any 
potential nonlinearities in the data are ignored.  That financial time series exhibit nonlinear 
behaviour is well documented in the literature (see, for example, Brooks (1996), or Hsieh (1991)) 
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and failure to account for this could lead to biased results.  In addition to the statistical evidence 
regarding the presence of nonlinearities, there are sound economic reasons why nonlinearities may 
be present in the pricing relationship between stock and stock index futures markets.  Specifically, 
in the absence of transaction costs arbitrage between stock and stock index futures markets is based 
on deviations of the futures price from its fair value as given by the spot price adjusted for the cost 
of carrying the underlying portfolio to maturity of the futures contract.  In the presence of 
transaction costs, however, there are bounds on such deviations within which arbitrage will not be 
triggered.  Therefore, there will be thresholds within which the relative difference between the 
futures and spot price can fluctuate without triggering arbitrage.  The result of this is nonlinearity in 
the relationship between stock and stock index futures markets and this nonlinearity may spill over 
into the lead-lag relationship between the markets.
1
  Second, the models used to investigate lead-lag 
relationships typically impose the often inappropriate restriction that the parameters of such models 
are stable over quite long periods.  The potential problem here is that changes in the nature of the 
lead-lag relationship over shorter periods may not be captured by these models. Alternatively, it may 
be the case that the lead-lag relationship is particularly strong over a short period such that the lead-
lag relationship appears to be present over the whole sample when in actual fact it is not.   
 
In this paper, we propose an alternative method for testing lead-lag relationships between stock and 
stock index futures markets based on Hinich (1996).  The tests that we utilise are similar in spirit to 
the Granger-Sims causality tests used in the extant literature but have the advantage that both linear 
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and nonlinear causality can be examined in a coherent testing environment without imposing strong 
restrictions on the stability of the relationship.  To anticipate the findings in the paper, the results 
from using this alternative methodology show that the lead-lag relationship is much less pronounced 
than that suggested by the more traditional Granger-Sims causality tests, suggesting that the 
traditional testing framework has a tendency to overstate the strength of the lead-lag relationship.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly reviews the existing literature on 
lead-lag relationships.  In order to facilitate comparison, section three implements tests of the lead-
lag relationship using the traditionally employed methodology whilst section four discusses and 
implements the alternative testing methodology.  Sections five and six presents the results of 
applying the alternative methodology and offers some concluding remarks respectively. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
If stock and stock index futures markets are functioning efficiently, then in the absence of market 
frictions, returns in the two markets will be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. This prediction 
arises directly from the cost of carry model of futures pricing which states that, 
 
 
where tF 2 is the stock index futures price quoted at time t, tS 3 is the value of the underlying stock 
index, r and d are the risk free rate and the dividend yield on the underlying index respectively and 
(T - t)4 is the time to maturity of the futures contract.  Writing this in return form we have, 
 
 
where 
t t t-1
f = ( F / F )ln 6 and  t t t-1s = ( S / S )ln 7.  Clearly, stock and stock index futures returns 
are perfectly contemporaneously correlated in this model and as such one market should not lead the 
other, that is, returns from one market should not help predict future returns in the other market.  
Tests of the proposition that there is no lead-lag relationship then essentially become causality tests 
with the model typically used being based on Sims (1972) (see, for example, Stoll and Whaley 
(1990), Chan (1992) and Grünbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994)).  The model is of the form 
 t t
(r-d)(T-t)
F  =  S e  (1) 
  
t t
f  =  s  +  (r -d)  (2) 
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where  ts 9 and  tf 10 are as defined earlier and tu 11 is a white noise error term.  The test is then 
one of whether the 
i
 12 are significant for i < 0 or i > 0 or both or neither. If the lags ( i < 0 ) are 
significantly different from zero but the leads are not then the futures leads the spot.  If this is true in 
reverse then the spot leads the futures whilst if both the lags and leads are significantly different 
from zero, causality is bi-directional. If none of the lags and leads are significant then there is no 
lead-lag relationship, a finding which is consistent with the prediction of the cost of carry model as 
long as there is strong positive contemporaneous correlation.   
 
In contrast to this prediction many studies, often using intra-daily data, find significant lead-lag 
relationships between stock and stock index futures markets (see, amongst others, Kawaller, Koch 
and Koch (1987), Kipnis and Tsang, (1983), Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992) and 
Grünbichler, Longstaff and Schwarz (1994)). Attempts to rationalise such a relationship typically 
appeal to differences in market microstructure and other frictions that can disrupt the cost of carry 
relationship. Grossman and Miller (1988), for example, argue that lower transaction costs and 
greater liquidity in the futures market provides more immediacy to traders and hence traders will 
transact in the futures market first with the result that the futures market will lead the spot market.  
In an analysis of the lead-lag relation between the DAX Index and DAX Index Futures contract in 
Germany, Grünbichler, Longstaff and Schwarz (1994) focus on the role of different trading systems 
  t 0 i=-k
k
i t+i ts  =   +  f  +  u   (3) 
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(screen versus floor trading) in explaining the lead-lag relationship and document evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that the price discovery process is accelerated through screen trading 
in the futures market which implies that the futures will lead the spot.  Stoll and Whaley (1990), on 
the other hand, consider the impact that nontrading and bid-ask effects may have on the lead-lag 
relationship
2
 and find that even after adjustments for nontrading and bid-ask effects is made, the 
lead-lag relationship between the S&P 500 Index and Index Futures market persists.  At first blush, 
the implication of these findings is that the lead-lag relationship is robust to any effect that might be 
termed institutional frictions such as stale prices in an index have and it is more an economic feature 
that needs to be explained.  We shall argue in the following sections that there is another 
explanation for the apparent robustness of the lead-lag relationship, specifically that the reason why 
lead-lag relationships seem so pronounced is that the methodology used has a tendency to overstate 
the strength of the relationship. 
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3. Results From Using The Traditional Testing Methodology 
 
In this section we investigate the lead-lag relationship between the FTSE 100 Index and Index 
Futures contract for the UK and between the S&P 500 Index and Index Futures contract for the US. 
 Most tests of the lead-lag relationship make use of intra-daily data on stock index and stock index 
futures returns.  One of the problems associated with tests of lead-lag relationships based on intra-
daily data is the possible effect nonsynchronous trading can have on the results.  Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that it can have a substantive impact on observed return behaviour (see Stoll and 
Whaley (1990) and Miller, Muthuswamy and Whaley (1994)).  To minimise the possible effects of 
nonsynchronous trading and hence reduce the possibility of identifying a spurious lead-lag 
relationship whilst at the same time allowing for lead-lag relationships to genuinely exist we use 
daily returns on both the FTSE 100 and S&P 500 Indices and Index Futures contracts over the 
period January 1985 to December 1993 and January 1983 to December 1993 respectively.  The 
FTSE 100 Index should not exhibit any nonsynchronous trading effects since it is calculated from 
mid-quotes that are binding, that is, market makers will trade at the quoted prices. Therefore, 
assuming that market makers update their quotes, nontrading effects should not be present.  The 
S&P 500 Index is constructed on the basis of transaction prices and therefore nonsynchronous 
trading effects may be present and therefore may contaminate the results.  Fortunately, a check to 
determine whether nontrading effects are present can be undertaken since if they are, from the 
models in Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Miller, Muthuswamy and Whaley (1994), observed returns 
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will follow a first order autoregressive process with a positive coefficient on lagged observed 
returns.
3
  Therefore, a test of 
1
= 0 13 in the regression  t
o
0 1 t-1
0
ts = + s +   14 should give some 
indication of whether nontrading effects are present in the data.  For the whole sample, estimates of 
the coefficient on lagged returns are (heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses) 
1
UK
= 0.0706(0.7993) 15 and 
1
US
= 0.0289(0.4299) 16.  These terms are clearly not significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that nonsynchronous trading is unlikely to be a problem in the data 
considered here. The data are daily closing prices for both the spot and futures markets. The futures 
data is constructed as a rollover with the rollover taking effect in the moth prior to expiration. This 
avoids possible expiration month effects that might generate odd price behaviour in the series. 
 
To provide a point of comparison for tests of the relationship based on cross correlations and cross 
bicorrelations, we first conduct tests of the lead-lag relationship between the respective domestic 
markets using equation 3.  Table I reports the results from this model.  In order to allow for possible 
changes in the nature of the lead-lag relationship, we estimate the model over the whole sample and 
over two sub-samples which we have termed the pre- and post-crash samples.  The pre-crash sample 
runs from the beginning of the sample period until October 16 1987 while the post-crash sample 
runs from 24 October 1988 until the end of the sample.  This misses out the rather volatile year that 
followed the crash of October 1987.  The results show that at the very least the futures leads the spot 
market by one day in both the US and the UK, irrespective of what sample period is used to estimate 
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the model.  This appears to provide prima facie support for the existence of a lead-lag relationship.  
However, figures 1 and 2 which plot the coefficient on 
t -1
f 17 in (3) when (3) is estimated using 
rolling least squares show that there is substantial instability in the coefficient estimate and therefore 
the lead-lag relationship may actually be overstated if we force the data for the entire sample to be 
generated by the same model.  We evaluate this proposition more fully in the next section. 
 
4. An Alternative Testing Methodology 
 
The results in the previous section clearly demonstrate that there is substantial instability in the lead-
lag relationship which needs to be accounted for.  Such a method that allows for this instability 
while at the same time allowing for the testing of a nonlinear lead-lag relationships is proposed in 
Hinich (1996).  Assume that we have two stationary time series { x (t) } and { y (t) } of length N, 
both of which have been standardised to have a sample mean of zero and a unit variance.  Let 
Cxy(r)=E[x(t)y(t+r)] and Cxxy(r,s)=E[x(t)x(t+r)y(t+s)] be the cross covariances and cross 
bicovariances between x and y respectively.  Then under the null hypothesis of independence, Cxy(r) 
= 0 and Cxxy(r,s) = 0 for r,s  0.  If there is lagged dependence, then Cxy(r) or Cxxy(r,s) will be non-
zero for at least one value of r or one pair of values for r and s respectively.  In terms of the lead-lag 
relationship between stock and stock index futures markets, if we define  ft and  st as { x (t) } and 
{ y (t) } respectively, then there is no lead-lag relationship if the null hypothesis of independence is 
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not rejected.  Tests of the null hypothesis of independence are based on the cross correlation and 
cross bicorrelation coefficients which are respectively given by
4
 
and 
 
Letting L = N
c
 where 0 < c <0.5, the statistics that test the null hypothesis of zero cross correlations 
and zero cross bicorrelations are given by (Hinich (1996)) 
   xy
r
L 1
2 xy
2H (N) = (N -  r ) C (r)


1
20    (6) 
and 
 
with Hxy and Hxxy being asymptotically chi squared as N, the length of the series, tends to infinity 
(see Theorem 1 of Hinich (1996)). 
 
The data are split into a series of windows of length 35 observations (giving a total of 79 windows 
for the US data and 56 for the UK). This corresponds to approximately seven trading weeks
5
, and 
 xy
-1
t
N r
(r) =  (N - r ) x(t)y(t + r)   ,   r  0


 
1
 (4) 
 xxy
-1
t
N m
(r,s) =  (N - m ) x(t)x(t + r)y(t + s)   ,   m = (r,s)



1
max  (5) 
 
 
 xxy
r
L
s
L 1
2 xxy
2H (N) =  (N -  m ) C (r,s)


11
 (7) 
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allows analysis of relatively short-term behaviour of the market which would be unobservable in an 
analysis of longer periods or time. This also removes the inappropriate restriction enforced in many 
papers that the model parameters and therefore the data generating process remains constant 
throughout the entire sample period. Thus although the sample covers both the pre- and post-1987 
stock market crash, the “windowing” approach used here implies that atypical patterns during this 
period can be observed, but will not affect the result overall.  A window is defined as “significant” if 
either the Hxy , Hxxy or Hyyx statistics are significant at the 1% level. A strict criterion is used so that 
only the most extreme results trigger a rejection of independence. The results for Hxxy and Hyyx  
statistics are calculated using the standardised residuals from a VAR(2,2) fit to the returns, which is 
sufficient to remove any linear (cross)dependence in the series. 
  
5. Results of the Alternative Testing Methodology 
The cross-correlation test gives no significant windows for the US, and only one significant window 
for the UK. This single significant window from a total of 56 corresponds to the period 12 March 
1992 - 4 May 1992 where the Hxy test statistic is highly significant with a p-value of 0.0048. Some 
statistics associated with this window are given in Table II. The largest non-contemporaneous cross-
correlation coefficients contributing to the test statistic for this window have a value of -0.48 and -
0.47. These are for the spot lagging the futures market by one period and for the futures lagging the 
spot by one period respectively. This indicates a bi-directional feedback relationship, and that the 
spot will move in the opposite direction to the way the futures market moved one day ago and vice-
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versa. Thus it appears in general extremely difficult to predict one market using a simple lagged 
linear model of the other. 
 
Considering the tests for nonlinear relationships, a similar result is observed. Again, only a single 
window is significant for the UK, occurring during a slightly later period, although still in 1992 (24 
June 1992 to 11 August 1992). Interestingly, it is not the same window as caused a rejection for the 
simple cross-correlation, indicating that linear and nonlinear lead / lag relationships need not occur 
at the same time. The most significant bicorrelation for the window has a value of -0.45, for the 
bicorrelation ftft-1st-2. Some statistics associated with that window are given in Table III. The VAR 
fit for this window is uncharacteristically low, indicating that the linear framework is insufficient to 
capture the dynamics of the series at this time. Both of these periods of linear and non-linear cross-
dependence occur at around the time of exchange rate and interest rate uncertainty immediately 
proceeding Sterling’s exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System 
on September 16, 1992. The story for the U.S. is, however, very different. There are in fact 5 
windows with significant Hxxy or Hyyx statistics during the sample period with all of the rejections of 
independence occurring around the time of fairly major changes in stock prices or interest rates. US 
(and world) interest rates altered during August 1983 and during July 1992, while the US stock 
market experienced a sharp fall in October 1989 and a full-blown crash in October 1987. Except for 
the stock market crash, it is always the xxy window which is significant. 
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Plots of the cross-bicorrelation test statistics, transformed to a uniform distribution for ease of 
interpretation, are given for the US and the UK in figures 3 and 4 respectively. The graphs show a 
high degree of volatility in the statistic over time.  This is suggestive of the fact that any lead-lag 
relationship can change substantially over time since recent research has shown that the relationship 
binding futures and spot markets becomes stronger when the individual markets are more volatile 
(Kawaller et al., 1993; Albert et al., 1993).  In the context of the analysis used here, it is 
straightforward to evaluate this proposition. This is achieved by calculating the correlation between 
the test statistics (Hxy , Hxxy or Hyyx) and the variances of the individual series for each window, 
which is used as a measure of the volatility of the series. Since contemporaneous correlations have 
been removed from the test statistics, if the proposition is correct (that is the markets are more 
closely bound together during periods of high market volatility), one would expect a large and 
negative correlation between the test statistics and the variances of the two individual series. Table 
IV shows that for the UK, this is indeed the case. The correlations between the xy statistics and the 
variances are smaller than -0.5, indicating strongly that, when the volatilities are high, the values of 
the test statistics will be lower, and thus that the individual markets show less evidence of feedback 
relationships and are therefore bound more closely together. We can test this formally using the 
Fisher test for significance of the correlations. The test statistic is given by 
 z =
0.5 [(1+ r) / (1- r)]
1
n - 3
log
22       (8) 
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where r is the sample correlation and n is the sample size (in this case, the number of windows). z is 
distributed approximately normally under the null hypothesis. The Fisher statistic shows that for the 
UK, the negative relationship between the cross-correlation test statistic and the variance of the 
series is indeed statistically significant. The correlation of the third order statistics with the variances 
are also fairly strong and negative for the UK (at around -0.2), although not as strong as for the 
linear cross-correlations, and not statistically significant. The picture for the US is very different: the 
correlations between the test statistics and the variances of the individual series are always positive 
but never significant. The important policy implication of this finding is that UK governments need 
not worry about the effects of large variations in futures (or spot market) prices upon the overall 
stability of the financial system. However, no such reassurance applies to the US. 
 
The differences in the number of significant cross-bicorrelation windows for the US and the UK 
data might be attributable to either differing market microstructures, or in government policies and 
different macroeconomic conditions that existed in the two countries over the sample period. In the 
US, the primary function of market makers is to reduce volatility, while in the UK, it is to ensure 
that there is sufficient liquidity in the market to generate immediacy for agents who wish to buy or 
sell. Moreover, in the US, market makers can request that trading be temporarily suspended during 
times of exceptional market turbulence; market makers in the UK have no such protection. These 
differences in microstructure are picked up by the nonlinear rather than the linear causality tests 
since this is a nonlinear, volatility-related, issue. 
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6. Conclusions  
This paper has employed a new technique for examining the extent of cross-correlations and cross-
bicorrelations between stock index and stock index futures contracts. The results show that these 
markets do not exhibit much evidence of second or third order cross-correlations, apparently 
consistent with efficient market theory. Given that the data examined is, however, of daily 
frequency, then the mere existence of a higher proportion of significant windows than one would 
expect if the data were drawn from two independent white noise processes is nonetheless a 
surprising result. Moreover, these results cannot satisfactorily be explained with reference to the 
microstructure arguments of Stoll and Whaley (1990), since nonsynchronous trading and other such 
anomalies should not be present in daily data. It is also of interest to note the differing results of 
applying the same methodology to the UK and US markets. These results have implications for the 
degree of integration of the two markets, an issue which has been of great concern to market 
practitioners and politicians, as well as academics, following the publication of the report by the 
Brady Commission (1988). Under most market conditions, we find that the stock and stock index 
futures markets are operating very closely together, with price movements for both occurring on the 
same day and in the same direction, leading to cross-correlations and cross-bicorrelations that are 
not significantly different from zero. 
 
Finally, it is also useful to observe that there is  more nonlinear cross-causality than linear cross-
causality between the S&P 500 spot and futures markets, so it appears that, at least at daily 
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frequency, a linear model of the VAR type would generally be insufficient to characterise the 
dynamics of the relation between the series, in agreement with the conclusions of Dwyer et al. 
(1996) who undertake a very high-frequency analysis of the S&P 500 markets. Our results are also 
consistent with Kawaller et al. (1987), who find that the contemporaneous correlations typically 
“swamp all lag impacts in both directions” (p1329), implying that any observed lead / lag 
relationships are unlikely to yield significant profits if employed in an active trading strategy. Unlike 
Kleidon and Whaley (1992) however, we find that this integration did not break down in the UK 
market during October 1987, although in fact there was some evidence of a breakdown during the 
middle of 1992. The latter may be attributable to the effects of the ERM debacle and the ensuing 
interest rate uncertainty which will more directly influence the relationship between stock index and 
stock index futures prices than a stock market crash which should affect both markets in a similar 
fashion. 
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 Table I 
 Parameter Estimates From Regression of Stock Index Returns on Lagged, 
 Contemporaneous and Leading Futures Returns 
  FTSE 100  S&P 500 
  Whole 
 Sample 
 Pre-crash 
 Sample 
 Post-crash 
 Sample 
 Whole 
 Sample 
 Pre-crash 
 Sample 
 Post -
crash 
 Sample 
-4     0.0201
**
 
  (3.0097) 
  0.0177 
  (1.7926) 
    0.0117
**
 
  (2.9622) 
 -0.0003 
 (-0.0489) 
  0.0019 
  (0.2362) 
  -0.0199
*
 
( -2.2647) 
-3  -0.0025 
 (-0.7461) 
  0.0026 
  (0.4012) 
  0.0025 
  (0.3892) 
  0.0018 
  (0.3841) 
  0.0076 
  (0.8046) 
  0.0017 
  (0.1812) 
-2  -0.0042 
 (-0.0946) 
  0.0052 
  (0.5630) 
  0.0093 
  (1.4945) 
   0.0503
*
 
  (2.5482) 
  -0.0069 
  (-0.5587) 
    0.0150
**
 
   (3.8300) 
-1     0.0893
**
 
  (10.855) 
   0.0615
*
 
  (2.5363) 
    0.0752
**
 
  (9.5992) 
    0.0585
**
 
  (2.6412) 
    0.1434
**
 
  (17.220) 
    0.0550
**
 
  (12.662) 
0     0.7808
**
 
  (52.621) 
    0.7898
**
 
  (21.511) 
    0.7662
**
 
  (31.670) 
    0.7681
**
 
  (30.507) 
    0.7559
**
 
  (33.374) 
    0.8782
**
 
  (35.180) 
1  -0.0111 
 (-0.8965) 
  0.0304 
  (1.9588) 
  0.0060 
  (0.6547) 
    0.0294
**
 
  (6.0458) 
  0.0094 
  (0.6960) 
  0.0153 
  (1.8102) 
2     0.0175
**
 
  (2.5753) 
  0.0119 
  (0.9634) 
 -0.0090 
 (-1.2472) 
    0.0252
**
 
  (6.7813) 
   0.0296
*
 
   (2.2488) 
   0.0176
*
 
  (2.1691) 
3   0.0054 
  (0.5715) 
  0.0167 
  (0.6897) 
   0.0192
*
 
  (2.0329) 
  0.0013 
  (0.6694) 
  0.0067 
  (1.0488) 
  -0.0076
*
 
 (-2.1079) 
4   0.0024 
  (0.7184) 
 -0.0173 
 (-1.2998) 
  0.0034 
  (0.5752) 
   -0.0127
*
 
  (-2.1046) 
  0.0020 
  (0.1310) 
  0.0012 
  (0.5622) 
Hlag    183.14
**
    17.340
**
    84.912
**
    188.63
**
    161.70
**
    63.892
**
 
Hlead   9.9324
*
  7.1651  7.1332    56.355
**
  7.6148   10.516
*
 
Notes : Figures in parentheses are t statistics calculated using the Newey and West (1987) variance-covariance matrix. 
Hlag and Hlead are Wald tests of the joint significance of lag and lead terms respectively and are distributed 
2
(4) under the 
null hypothesis that the relevant coefficients are zero. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
  t 0 i=-k
k
i t+i ts  =   +  f  +  u   
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 Figure 1 
 Coefficient on 
t -1
f 24 for the S&P 500, Estimated by Rolling Least Squares 
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 Figure 2 
 Coefficient on 
t -1
f 25 for the FTSE 100, Estimated by Rolling Least Squares 
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Table II 
 
Results of The Cross-Correlation Test for the Significant Windows for the US and UK 
 
Dates Covered 
By Window 
p-Values of Test Statistics 
xy              xxy              yyx 
Significant 
Correlations (at lag) 
R
2
 for 
VAR 
Fit 
US 
No significant window 
UK 
12/3/92-4/5/92 0.0048 0.9092 0.7323 -0.47 (-1)   -0.48 (1) 0.740 
Note: Futures market leads for positive lags, spot market leads for negative lags. 
 
 
 
 
Table III  
 
Results of the Cross-Bicorrelation Test for the Single Significant Window using Residuals 
from a BVAR(2,2) Fit 
 
Dates Covered By 
Window 
p-Values of Test Statistics 
xy          xxy           yyx 
Most Significant 
Bicorrelation (at lag) 
R
2
 for 
VAR 
Fit 
US 
22/7/83-9/9/83 0.0040 0.1011 0.8685 0.43(1,-1) 0.571 
28/7/87-15/9/87 0.0001 0.2134 0.9817 -0.48(1,1) 0.516 
16/9/87-3/11/87 0.0316 0.0020 0.6525 -0.39(1,1) 0.717 
11/10/87-28/11/89 0.0000 0.1713 0.9378 -0.60(1,-2) 0.749 
1/6/92-17/7/92 0.0002 0.2673 0.7909 -0.66(1,1) 0.602 
UK 
24/6/92-11/8/92 0.9931 0.0073 0.0220 -0.45 (1,2) 0.616 
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Figure 3  
The Transformed Uniform Cross-Bicorrelation Test Statistics for the US 
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Figure 4  
The Transformed Uniform Cross-Bicorrelation Test Statistics for the UK 
 
Table IV 
Correlations of the Cross-Correlation and Cross-Bicorrelations Test Statistics with the 
Individual Variances for the US and the UK 
Correlation 
Between 
xy, 
Var(X) 
xy, 
Var(Y) 
xxy, 
Var(X) 
xxy, 
Var(Y) 
yyx,  
Var (X) 
yyx, 
Var(Y) 
US 
Value  0.20 0.19 0.02 0.24 0.06 0.24 
Fisher 0.768 0.728 0.080 0.927 0.227 0.927 
UK 
Value -0.55 -0.52 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.18 
Fisher  -2.115** -1.971* 0.765 -0.729 -0.658 -0.622 
Notes: Value denotes the value of the correlation coefficient and “Fisher” denotes the value of the Fisher test that the true 
value of that coefficient is zero. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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1
 For more on threshold nonlinearity see Yadav, Pope and Paudyal (1994) and Dwyer, Locke and 
Yu (1996) for evidence relating to the US and Brooks and Garrett (1996) for evidence relating to the 
UK. 
     
2
 The importance of this is that if factors such as nontrading are present then they may induce a 
spurious lead-lag relationship because in the case of nontrading the index will contain stale prices 
and thus the futures will appear to lead the spot for no other reason than the effect of stale prices on 
the index.  Note also that technically, we can distinguish between nontrading and nonsynchronous 
trading.  Nonsynchronous trading is the situation where securities trade at least once every time 
interval but not necessarily at the end of the interval, whereas nontrading is the situation where 
securities do not trade for several time intervals.  However, since the effect of both of these is to 
induce autocorrelation in stock returns, we will use the two interchangeably here. 
     
3
 If all of the stocks within the portfolio have the same probability of nontrading then the 
coefficient on lagged observed returns in the AR(1) model provides an estimate of that nontrading 
probability. 
     
4
 Notice that the summations in (4) and (5) exclude contemporaneous terms.  This is to avoid 
rejection of the null hypothesis of independence because of the strong contemporaneous correlations 
that we would expect to exist between spot and futures returns. 
5
 The results are not, however, sensitive to fairly large changes in this parameter. 
